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Suren Pillay, Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa
This review presents the major lines of investigation regarding violence in Africa since the Cold War. After a historical introduction to the development of violent 
phenomena and their political contexts, diverse issues such as civil war, democratization, vigilantism, and the role of youth are assessed. It is argued that re-
cent research has produced important insights by re-focusing on violent phenomena beyond the state. Yet despite the increasing number of non-state violent 
actors active on the African continent, to speak of a “privatization” of violence may be premature. 
Since Hegel, Achille Mbembe writes, Africa has been de-
scribed as a space of “catastrophe, convulsions, disaster al-
ready happened or about to happen – of breakdown, 
instant terror. It matters little that the words do not relate 
any precise event, provided that they preserve, for the phe-
nomena allegedly being described, stark immediacy, and 
testify to the primacy of sensation and the utterness of the 
region’s disorder” (Mbembe 2001, 177). It is to overcome 
this specific imaginary that we must begin this review ar-
ticle of research on violence in Africa south of the Sahara 
by exploring the historicity of the issue. A historical intro-
duction to the development of violent phenomena and the 
parallel evolution of political institutions is required, be-
cause forms of violence are always closely related to the re-
spective political context. Moreover, such an approach 
linking the study of violence with a historical sociology of 
the political may be most fruitful for further research.
Our second concern in this contribution is to outline major 
research directions during the two decades since the end of 
the Cold War, during which dramatic change in the African 
socio-political landscape has been accompanied by a refo-
cusing of Africanist scholarship. In particular, we focus on 
the fields of civil war, vigilantism and security in the urban 
space, and youth. Our decision has to do with an important 
claim regarding the supposed privatization of violence in 
the last two decades. While parts of Africa have undergone a 
process of democratization, civil wars devastated other 
areas. The debates around these developments can be best 
brought into a single framework of analysis by analyzing 
the fields of study we have chosen. We argue that since the 
Cold War, research on violence in Africa has made import-
ant advances by focusing more closely on „non-political“ 
forms of violence, such as social and criminal violence. In 
this context, the big number of non-state-armed groups, 
the newly found agency of youth, but also the increasing 
number of security companies and communal vigilante 
groups has been interpreted as a privatization of violence 
regulation. However, it is evident from the books and ar-
ticles reviewed here that it is misleading to discard the role 
of the state. Whatever the form of „private“ violence, public 
authorities play an important role, whether as targets, in-
stigators, profiteers, or regulators. Moreover, even sup-
posedly private violence has important repercussions on the 
form of political order in the respective society. The ar-
gument of a privatization (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007) 
may thus be misleading, given that the distinction between 
public and private in neopatrimonial societies is by defini-
tion always blurred (Médard 1991; Bayart 1993).
Readers will miss other important fields of inquiry. For ex-
ample, we do not deal specifically with the fields of peace 
IJCV : Vol. 5 (1) 2011, pp. 13 – 31
Veit, Barolsky, and Pillay: Violence Research in Africa 15
mediation and peacekeeping, with sexual violence in war, 
or with terrorism. The question of gender, meanwhile, re-
curs throughout. As Cynthia Cockburn argues, gender is an 
ordering principle that pervades all power systems (2001, 
15). Instead of adding a specific section on gender and vi-
olence, we therefore opted to treat gender as a cross-cutting 
analytical perspective.
Even despite these chosen topical limitations, there are im-
mense difficulties in writing a review article on violence re-
search in Africa. The first problem is that for disciplines 
ranging from anthropology and history to political science 
(from which most works reviewed here stem), violence is an 
underlying theme across a wide range of material, but rather 
rarely the explicit issue of analytical concern. Whether we 
are concerned with armed conflict, the formation of the 
state, or even supposedly unrelated issues such as the devel-
opment of health provision (Hunt 1991, 1999), violence ob-
viously plays an important role. However, in most research 
physical assault is mentioned only in passing or even re-
mains unacknowledged. Many authors do not directly deal 
with the actual physical action and reaction, but describe in-
stead what leads to the act and what happens thereafter.
What is lost in such distanced or indirect treatment of as-
sault on individual physical integrity is the effects on the per-
son concerned, but also the psychological impact on society 
and political order. The strong symbolic significance of viol-
ence is mirrored by the extensive media coverage of certain 
phenomena. Media reports tend to sensationalize violence, 
exploiting the horror experienced by victims and observers. 
While such sensationalization hardly contributes to a better 
understanding of causes or outcomes, it nonetheless pro-
vides an important clue to the emblematic repercussions of 
violence: The horror and trauma on the one side, and the 
immediate experience of power on the other. Such aspects, 
and their consequences, deserve more analytical scrutiny. 
Thus a direct examination of violent acts and their immedi-
ate and indirect consequences is a research desideratum. No-
netheless, academic works that deal with violence from an 
analytical distance have also contributed many insights.
The second reason for the complexity of writing about vi-
olence research in Africa is rooted in the moral im-
plications of the topic. Violence is an emotive issue, and 
cannot possibly be described without at least an implicit 
normative evaluation. Such normative evaluation, in turn, 
leads to the issue of legitimate representation. The study of 
violence in Africa, as in other postcolonial spaces, is closely 
related to questions of perspective. Mahmood Mamdani, 
for example, relates contemporary political discourse on 
violence to the colonial imaginary of the non-Western sav-
age and the Western savior (Mamdani 2009). At the same 
time there is a need for differentiation between the por-
trayal of Africa as a region of meaningless brutality, and an 
adequate criticism of illegitimate uses of violence by auth-
orities (Mbembe 2001, 24–101). 
Even though we have sought to emphasize studies by Afri-
can scholars, these voices are still underrepresented due to 
the weak institutionalization of violence research on the 
continent itself. African universities, starting from a weak 
base at independence, expanded their activities during the 
brief period until the late 1970s. Thereafter, economic cri-
sis, increasingly authoritarian regimes, and societal turmoil 
drained material and political support. Consultancies for 
international development agencies supplement many uni-
versity teachers’ income, but leave little space for freely de-
veloped research agendas. Private universities, which are 
blossoming, concentrate on teaching rather than research. 
Many academics leave their home institutions for Europe 
and North America, and accordingly most research on vi-
olence in Africa is undertaken in institutions outside the 
continent. Universities and research centers in Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, and the 
United States contribute most. The biggest exception is 
South Africa, which provides extensive cutting-edge aca-
demic scrutiny of violent phenomena.
Regardless of where they are born, socialized, or employed, 
there are very few social scientists researching Africa. 
Clearly, given the comparatively high rate of political viol-
ence on the continent and the scope of its problems, viol-
ent phenomena are understudied. Large parts of the 
continent, in particular rural regions, remain practically 
untouched by academic scrutiny. The surprise about insur-
gencies, such as in West Africa in the early 1990s, and more 
recently also in Darfur, testifies to this neglect. These con-
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flicts were of course not at all sudden outbreaks of extreme 
and organized mass violence. Rather, political and socio-
economic developments leading to civil strife remained 
unnoticed, sometimes for decades. On-going attempts to 
install “conflict early-warning systems” are doomed to fai-
lure if the quantity of scientific research is not increased. 
On the other hand, certain countries are comparatively 
well covered, in particular those that are relatively prosper-
ous: South Africa again, as well as Nigeria and Kenya. What 
French colonialists termed “l’Afrique inutile,” those parts 
of the continent without exploitable resources, remains vir-
tually out of the frame. 
The structural limits of Africanist scholarship are also re-
flected in the scarcity and unreliability of quantitative data. 
The Africanist tradition, rooted in anthropology, is re-
flected in most of the literature cited in this review, which 
is almost without exception based on qualitative methods. 
This tradition also leans heavily toward single case studies. 
Systematic comparisons between African societies remain 
scarce, still less with other continents. Only the field of de-
velopment studies produces its own set of dependable data. 
Afrobarometer (http://www.afrobarometer.org/) is virtually 
the only institution providing cross-nationally comparable 
opinion surveys, but covers little more than a dozen coun-
tries. Future research should build on the existing quali-
tative strengths of Africanist tradition, but also add 
quantitative and comparative methods more systematically.
1. Violence and Political Institutions in African History
Given the scarcity of written sources, very little is known 
about violence in pre-colonial Africa. It is commonly ar-
gued that before the arrival of imperialist forces, warfare 
and violence were limited. Without firearms, violence was 
restricted to face-to-face interaction. The few large cen-
tralized political domains that existed alongside many 
stateless societies made use of violence to uphold and ex-
pand their rule. The abundance of land in the sparsely 
populated continent, however, allowed for flight and mi-
gration as a widespread reaction to violent suppression 
(Vansina 1966; Smith 1989; Reid 2002; Chrétien 2003). 
These circumstances changed dramatically with the advent 
of capitalist incursions. The transatlantic slave trade after 
1492 disrupted societies, particularly along the West Afri-
can coast. While mercantilist elites at the coast thrived as 
intermediaries, the violent hunt for human merchandise 
had devastating consequences for inland societies. Societies 
in the Sahel also suffered from the decline of trans-Saharan 
trade, as sea trade favored coastal societies (Rodney 1972; 
Wirz 1972; Lovejoy 2000; Fisher 2001; Iliffe 1995, 127–58). 
On the eastern side of the continent, the slave trade had for 
centuries been the domain of merchants operating in the 
Indian Ocean. Their activities peaked in the nineteenth 
century, when the Waarabu traders established commer-
cial/political domains stretching from Zanzibar to the 
Congo River (Whiteley 1971; Page 1974; Iliffe 1979; 
Cooper 1997; Fair 1998; Fabian 2000).
The West African jihads and the Southern African „Mfec-
ane“ represented potential indigenous trajectories toward 
modern state systems, including „modern“ violence. The 
West African Islamic jihads, beginning with the revol-
utionary founding of the Caliphate of Sokoto in 1806, suc-
ceeded in establishing prosperous statehood based on 
religious legitimacy. The second major process of violent 
state formation in this period, the Mfecane, was a large-
scale migration movement in Southern Africa from after 
1800. It has long been traced to the expansion of the Zulu 
kingdom. Newer historiography acknowledges the major 
impact of Great Britain’s acquisition of the Cape Colony in 
1806, and subsequent Afrikaner treks into the continent 
(Hamilton 1995; Etherington 2001; Cobbing 1988; Iliffe 
1995, 168–80; Robinson 2000). 
The societal and ecological crisis in East and Central Africa 
took full effect with the final expansion of colonialism from 
after 1880. Colonialism meant violent conquests, rebellions, 
massacres and genocide, and previously unknown forms of 
labor exploitation and social stratification, as well as dev-
astating epidemics and famines. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century the whole continent had been colonized 
by European powers, apart from Liberia and Ethiopia. The 
Europeans held the unmatchable advantage of machine 
guns, which they used to kill in unprecedented numbers. 
Notably, African mercenaries formed the rank-and-file of 
almost all colonial armies, creating the basis for the central 
political role of African armies after decolonization (Lyons 
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1985; Headrick 1994; Trotha 1994; Iliffe 1995, 187-211; 
Glassman 1995; Hochschild 1999; Chrétien 2003; Hoppe 
2003; Leopold 2005a; Pesek 2005; Deutsch 2006).
Despite the relative briefness of colonial rule, capitalism, 
urbanization and labor migration, political reorganization 
and the reconfiguration of gender, ethnicity, religion, and 
family bonds led to profound changes in Africa’s social 
structures. While economic exploitation and racial segre-
gation were often violently enforced, especially in the form 
of forced and indentured labor, the period between 1918 
and 1945 was marked by a relative quiet, a “pax coloniale.” 
Large-scale anti-colonial revolts were avoided, as the old 
and new elites of African chiefs, teachers, clerks, clergymen, 
traders, farmers, non-commissioned officers, and trade 
union leaders instead used largely peaceful means to con-
duct political and social conflict (Cooper 2002, 20–65; Iliffe 
1995, 213–44). 
After the Second World War, social stratification and politi-
cal conflict between independence movements and colonial 
authorities led to an increase in organized violence. In 
Kenya, land scarcity and British repression sparked the 
Mau-Mau guerilla war from 1952 to 1960 (Buijtenhuijs 
1982; Kanogo 1987; Presley 1988; Berman and Lonsdale 
1992, 225-467). In French Cameroon, armed insurrection 
began in 1955 (Mbembe 1996). Overall, however, decolon-
ization was characterized by the absence of large-scale or-
ganized violence. Weakened by war, pressurized by the new 
superpowers, facing protest movements in many colonies 
and military defeat in Algeria and Indochina, the European 
colonial powers agreed to independence rather rapidly. By 
1965 most countries in East and West Africa were indepen-
dent (Cooper 2002, 66-84; Hargreaves 1996; Rotberg and 
Mazrui 1970). Only Portugal and the southern African 
settler colonies clung to the status quo; the latter region be-
came a major battleground of the Cold War. Wars of inde-
pendence, externally stoked civil wars, and uprisings 
against white domination lasted until 1980 in Zimbabwe, 
until 1990 in Namibia, until 1992 in Mozambique, until 
1994 in South Africa, and until 2002 in Angola (Lodge 
1983, 1991; Ranger 1985; Katjavivi 1988; Geffray 1990; 
Price 1991; Birmingham 1992; Kriger 1992; Chabal 2002; 
Cooper 2002, 133–54).
The initial optimism of the 1960s nationalist mobilization 
quickly waned, especially in Central, East and North-East 
Africa. Given the frequency of civil wars, an account of viol-
ence in post-colonial Africa has primarily to describe 
 internal civil strife. The first country to slide into outright 
chaos was the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a 
litany of military mutiny, coups, external intervention, prov-
incial secession, and insurgency began immediately after in-
dependence in 1960. It was 1965 before stable but 
authoritarian rule re-emerged (Young 1966, 1994; Young 
and Turner 1985; Callaghy 1984; Schatzberg 1980, 1988; Co-
query-Vidrovitch, Forest, and Weiss 1987; Nzongola-Ntalaja 
2002; Birmingham and Martin 1998). In neighboring Bu-
rundi and Rwanda, colonially hardened ethnic conflict set 
genocidal dynamics in motion (Lemarchand 1977, 1994). In 
Sudan and Chad, civil wars across ancient boundaries be-
tween northern and southern political  figurations began 
shortly after independence and lasted, with short periods of 
peace, for decades (Woodward 1990; Daly and Sikaninga 
1993; Buijtenhuijs 1978, 1987). Ethiopia slipped into wars of 
secession in 1962, followed by revolution, civil war, famine, 
and finally inter-state warfare with Eritrea (1998–2000), 
which had won independence in 1991 (Clapham 1988; de 
Waal 1991). Uganda endured military dictatorship in the 
1970s, followed by civil war until 1985 (Mazrui 1975; Mam-
dani 1996). The sources of these manifold wars and armed 
conflicts were, of course, very heterogeneous. Some com-
mon important factors can nonetheless be discerned in most 
of the armed conflicts, such as rivalries between Cold War 
superpowers entangled with internal elite competition; older 
and colonially induced group conflicts based on regional-
ism, ethnicity or religion; economic decline; and repression 
of social movements by authoritarian or militarized states. 
Much easier access to modern weaponry, which had been al-
most unavailable during the colonial era, allowed insurgents 
to confront regimes. Only a few states in eastern and south-
ern Africa – most outstandingly Tanzania, but also Kenya, 
Malawi and Zambia – managed to uphold relative peace.
West Africa, on the other hand, was largely spared warfare 
between 1960 and 1989, with only the Biafra secession and 
war-induced famine in Nigeria (1967–70) as the first Afri-
can humanitarian crisis resulting from violent conflict to 
be widely reported by Western media (de St. Jorre 1972; 
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Harrison and Palmer 1986). The conflicts that existed in 
most West African countries, often between coastal and in-
land regions, were initially managed by constitutional 
means (Iliffe 1995, 248). However, many states experienced 
military coups, dictatorship, or one-party rule (Rotberg 
and Mazrui 1970; Iliffe 1979; Cruise O’Brien, Dunn, and 
Rathbone 1989; Nugent 2004, 204–59). In 1989 only seven 
out of forty-five states south of the Sahara were politically 
pluralistic (Iliffe 1995, 261).
2. Research on Violence in Africa after the Cold War
The collapse of the Soviet Union opened up new spaces for 
political reform and inspired many movements for demo-
cratic change. Economic decay had already hollowed out 
political systems based on neo-patrimonial legitimacy. 
Long-term decline stemmed from the failure of state-led 
development in the 1960s, steep increases in the price of oil 
imports, and falling prices for Africa’s export products in 
the 1970s, as well as a credit crunch and externally imposed 
structural adjustment programs in the 1980s (Iliffe 1995, 
252-56; Cooper 2002, 91–132; on post-independence econ-
omies see also Hyden 1980; Bates 1981; Collier 1990; Mac-
Gaffey 1991; Scott 1998, 223–61; Guyer 2004; on 
neo-patrimonialism in Africa see Médard 1991; Bayart 
1993; Chabal and Daloz 1999).
The excluded and marginalized (often urban youth) took to 
the streets. Frequently trade unions, churches, and re-
emerging opposition parties took the lead. Very few regimes 
resisted their demands outright, and democratization be-
came a relative, if hard won and often inchoate success story 
in many countries (Nugent 2004, 368–433). Yet the end of 
the Cold War did not lead everywhere to liberal democratic 
dispensations. A new wave of civil wars rolled across parts 
of West, Central and North-East Africa. Mirroring the 
South African experience of the Cold War, these civil wars 
were closely connected and reinforced one another. But un-
like the Cold War era these wars were less obviously driven 
by the geostrategic motivations of African states and ex-
ternal allies. Social, political, and economic pressures within 
societies seemed to play a more important role.
Democratization processes in many countries and the re-
lated wave of violent conflict after the Cold War brought 
societal developments beyond the narrow confines of inter-
national and state politics into focus. Both processes were 
set in motion by societal groups, namely social movements 
and rebel organizations. This shift in perspective provided 
for a major advance in the study of violence on the African 
continent, as it also led to new insights into the relation-
ships between social structures, political action, criminal-
ity, and security.
2.1. Civil Wars
Reflecting its prevalence on the continent, the study of civil 
war has become the dominant field of violence research in 
Africa, differentiated into a number of sub-fields. In studies 
of the root causes of civil wars, probably the dominant re-
search issue, a recent shift towards questions of citizenship 
and political exclusion has emerged (Mamdani 1996; Ak-
indès 2003; Sall 2004; Ouedraogo and Sall 2008; Colin, 
Kouamé, and Soro 2007). Loosely related with this are 
studies of how democratic elections may instigate, but also 
resolve violent political crisis (Amouzouvi 2000; Kaya 
2004; Makumbe 2006; Akokpari 2007; Belinga 2007; John 
2007; Lafargue and Katumanga 2008). 
In West Africa, a string of civil wars shattered societies, be-
ginning in Liberia in late 1989 and almost seamlessly en-
croaching neighboring Sierra Leone a little more than a 
year later (Richards 1996; Ellis 1999; Abdullah 2004; Keen 
2005). At times, Guinea threatened to become involved in 
this cluster of warfare (Chambers 2004). While these con-
flicts ended in 2002–2003, the burden of armed conflict 
and partition shifted to Côte d’Ivoire between 2003 and 
2007, with post-electoral fighting there from 2010 to 2011 
(Akindès 2004; Banégas 2006). The West African nations of 
Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Niger, and Congo-Brazzaville 
also faced army revolts, secessionist movements, and insur-
rections (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999; Vigh 2006; Foucher 
2005; Klute and Trotha 2000; Deycard 2007). At the Horn 
of Africa, large parts of Somalia have been gripped by clan-
based warfare and devoid of a national state or government 
since 1991 (Menkhaus 2003; Marchal 2007). After the civil 
war between the government and southern rebels in Sudan 
ended with a power-sharing deal in 2003, insurgents in 
Darfur began their fight for political inclusion (Prunier 
2007; Mamdani 2009).
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The biggest and in terms of human cost most destructive 
cluster of wars and rebellions in contemporary Africa oc-
curred in the Great Lakes region. An insurrection in Rwan-
da beginning in 1990 revived elite and ethnic conflicts 
dating from the pre-colonial and colonial period. The in-
surgents’ enemies, in particular radical elements in the 
Rwandan government, reacted in 1994 with a genocide 
against the Tutsi minority, which resulted in death on an 
unprecedented scale (Prunier 1997; Des Forges 1999; 
Gourevitch 1999; Hintjens 1999; Melvern 2000, 2004; 
Mamdani 2001; Straus 2006). The political fallout led to 
“Africa’s World War” beginning in 1996, largely fought on 
the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
involving the armies of about ten countries and many 
more non-state armed groups. While these wars are now li-
mited, with a peace deal in Burundi, more stability in the 
Central African Republic, and the withdrawal of foreign ar-
mies from the DR Congo, some regions are still suffering 
civil strife (Turner 2007; Veit 2010).
The study of civil wars in Africa has to a large extent been 
actor-centred, with a focus on insurgency groups, militias, 
and other forms of non-state armed organization (Clap-
ham 1998; Bwenge 2003; Boas and Dunn 2007; Weinstein 
2007; Debos 2008; Schlichte 2009). Internationally, materi-
alist explanations pertaining to opportunistic and self-
interested behavior of rebel groups have attained 
prominence (Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004). Africanist scholars have produced few works sup-
porting these arguments and tended instead to voice criti-
cal perspectives. These critics emphasize the political 
character of contemporary conflicts and the complexity of 
motivations, as opposed to binary assumptions about 
“greed” or “grievance” (Marchal 2000; Marchal and Mess-
iant 2002; for critical views referring also to non-African 
contexts see Kalyvas 2001; Schlichte 2006). These ar-
guments anticipate the greed thesis, but without the latter’s 
negative connotations. Nonetheless, the structural relation-
ship between natural resources and violent conflict is an 
issue, most importantly regarding civil strife in the oil-rich 
Niger Delta (Ifeka 2001, 2004, 2006; Obi 2004, 2006, 2008; 
Omeje 2004, 2006; Anugwom 2005; Dibua 2005; Onuoha 
2007, 2008; Owolabi and Okwechime 2007; Owusu-Kor-
anteng 2008).
The greed vs. grievance-debate tended to hinder rather 
than advance social research, as the focus on perpetrators’ 
motivations merely revisited older discussions. Already in 
1970, Ted Gurr answered the question of “Why Men Rebel” 
with the grievance argument, which he termed “relative de-
privation.” Other scholars challenged this argument, and 
posited that “grievances alone cannot explain mobiliz-
ation” (Tarrow 1998, 15) because grievances are practically 
ubiquitous, whereas protest and violent rebellion are not. 
The “contentious politics” school developed a perspective 
of “opportunity and constraint” as central conditions for 
the emergence of militant oppositions (McAdam, Tarrow, 
and Tilly2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). 
While rebel groups gained enormous attention, state mili-
taries and states apparatuses have attracted comparatively 
little attention. Rather than looking at what African states 
are doing, attention has – through the lens of „weak“ or 
“failed” states – shifted to what they do not do, and how 
this supposed void leads to conflict (Young 1998, Reno 
1998, Fawole and Ukeje 2005, Fomin and Forje 2005; criti-
cally Chabal and Daloz 1999). In response, other authors 
describe how alternative powerful institutions emerge even 
when state institutions collapse during civil war (Vlassen-
root and Raeymaekers 2004; Menkhaus 2004; Tull 2005; 
Raeymaekers 2007). Yet we still know too little about the 
dynamics in violent state organizations in Africa.
2.2. Democratization, Criminal Violence, Vigilantism, and Urban Security
Democratization was the order of the day during the early 
1990s in many African countries. In particular southern 
Africa entered a period of greater political stability after the 
end of the Cold War and the introduction of representative 
democracy in South Africa in 1994. As the political land-
scape became pacified, research agendas changed. At the 
same time, social and criminal violence seemed to be on 
the increase not only in South Africa, but also in commer-
cially vibrant cities such as Nigeria’s Lagos and Kenya’s 
Nairobi. 
Democratic societies rule through consent rather than out-
right coercion, and therefore rely on the legitimate auth-
ority of the state. One of the core responsibilities of a state is 
to protect the “right to life.” The way in which the state pro-
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tects this right can impact on its long-term legitimacy and 
authority. High levels of violent crime, assault, and murder 
indicate that the state might be failing to create the environ-
ment for a safe and secure community, and therefore im-
pacting negatively on its capacity to govern effectively.
The shift from political to social and criminal violence is 
increasingly explained with reference to the breakdown of 
social cohesion, which is perceived to have created an 
anomic context in which violent crime is likely to occur. 
Shaw notes in this vein: “[A]part from generating par-
ticular forms of criminality (most notably the organized 
variety), transitions also have important impacts on the so-
cial controls present in any society. In many instances a 
weakening of these provides an environment that may be 
more conducive to criminality” (Shaw 2002, 2). In this con-
text the concept of “social cohesion” has become increas-
ingly common in policy environments such as that of 
South Africa over the past few years. It is argued that in 
order to reduce levels of violence, the ways in which citizens 
relate to one another as citizens need to be transformed.
However, in South Africa and in postcolonial societies in 
general, the notion of „good citizens“ who police them-
selves in terms of a commonly held set of norms and valu-
es, falls apart in a context characterized historically by 
multiple overlapping systems of social authority and nor-
mative regimes. As Peter Ekeh (1975) notes, the African co-
lonial experience, and in particular the experience of 
indirect rule, such as in colonial tribal jurisdictions and 
Black “homelands” during apartheid) creates multiple 
spaces of rights, obligations, and ethical conduct that are 
not necessarily concordant with the juridical rights and ob-
ligations normatively articulated in democratic con-
stitutions (see also Mamdani 1996; Joseph 1997). It is in 
this context that violent crime can lead to the creation of 
forms of community that are at odds with the unifying, 
nation-building efforts of governments. The result, in Afri-
ca and other regions of the global South, is Balkanized 
zones of governance and citizenship: informal settlements, 
gated communities, vigilante groups, and gangs.
The areas most affected by violent crime also tend to be the 
areas most affected by “everyday” social violence, such as 
gendered and domestic violence, and economic marginaliz-
ation. In South Africa, the areas most affected are black 
communities in townships, mostly working class with high 
levels of unemployment and poverty. In contexts of ongoing 
socio-economic deprivation, “community” can thus become 
an identity that coheres around a notion of social exclusion. 
People identify themselves as victims of a lack of delivery 
and poor local government representation and service, and 
see themselves as a community in opposition to the state. In 
the South African context this has been most explicitly ar-
ticulated in “service delivery protests” (Delaney 2007).
In this context a growing body of literature on vigilante 
groups has emerged in the African context and beyond (for 
a global review, see Pratten and Sen 2008). Vigilante groups 
play an ambiguous role, in some instances offering genuine 
protection but sometimes degenerating into protection 
rackets. In the latter case, vigilantism is but one form of or-
ganized crime. This tension is mirrored by vigilantes’ rela-
tionships with the state. Vigilante groups may pose a 
challenge to the state by threatening its monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence but they are also often intimately 
linked to political leaders or formal political parties. Laur-
ent Fourchard, for example, identifies an ambiguous rela-
tionship between the state and vigilante groups in 
southwestern Nigeria. Vigilantism can be interpreted as a 
sign of state erosion. But as Fourchard (2008) explains in 
the particular case study he relates, the term was originally 
introduced with a positive connotation by police forces 
themselves. It is thus far from clear whether vigilantism 
constitutes a challenge to state institutions. Vigilantism 
may represent an actively chosen alternative form of social 
organization, rather than simply being the consequence of 
state weakness (Buur 2008). 
Nigeria is one of the countries most strongly affected by 
criminal violence and vigilantism. A survey of violent 
crime in the sprawling metropolis of Lagos, Nigeria, found 
that, faced with high incidence and fear of crime: “many 
communities and individuals took several measures to re-
duce their feeling of vulnerability and minimize risk of vic-
timization. Eighty one percent of the respondents said that 
vigilantes existed in their communities, while seventy seven 
percent reported that the vigilantes were paid for their ser-
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vices” (Alemika and Chukwuma 2005). Many militant 
groupings were founded as a response to the plundering of 
the country’s resources by political elites, argue Charles 
Gore and David Pratten (2003; Ukeje 2001). Pratten goes 
on to argue that vigilante groups in Nigeria are primarily 
popular responses to criminality. Their spread however has 
been so ubiquitous that their impact is much more per-
vasive. Vigilantism in Nigeria is intimately linked to the 
political economy, connects urban and rural spaces, repro-
duces or restructures lineages and ethnicity, and includes 
activities ranging from crime fighting to political lobbying. 
Discursively, Nigerian vigilantism is embedded in nar-
ratives of contested rights (Pratten 2006, 2008a, 2008b).
In South Africa there has also been an increase in the preva-
lence of vigilante groups across the country. Ranging from 
more formally organized groupings such as People Against 
Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in the Western Cape, 
groups in KwaZulu-Natal province started out as commu-
nity neighborhood watches, some of which have taken on 
violent and radicalized forms. Identification with a specific 
„community“ in the case of PAGAD and neighborhood 
watches indicates the recovery of a religious and racially 
hegemonic social morality fraying at the seams as a result of 
substance abuse, gangsterism and poverty (Pillay 2002).
Vigilantism in Africa is difficult to define and delineate in 
terms of spaces, culture, and discourse. While it is often 
considered an urban phenomenon, some groups, par-
ticularly in Kenya, bridge the urban-rural divide. Most 
widely discussed in this regard is the Mungiki vigilante sect 
and other similar groups in Kenya. The Mungiki are legit-
imized by ethno-centrism, religion, and the contested his-
tory of the anti-colonial and intra-ethnic Mau-Mau 
uprising. They boast strong links to particular political 
camps that are well established in state institutions. How-
ever, depending on which political camp gained a hege-
monic position in the apparatus, there were periods when 
the state engaged the group in intense fighting (Wamue 
2001; Anderson 2002; Kagwanja 2003, 2006b). Some 
groupings show the influence of urban globalized youth 
culture. One example is analyzed by Remy Bazenguissa-
Ganga in Congo-Brazzaville, where politicized frustrated 
youth formed urban defense groups, which turned into 
armed militias that linked up with rival political camps and 
fought much of the civil war of the 1990s (1999a, 1999b). 
Their identity, Bazenguissa-Ganga argues, was strongly 
linked to Western media images. The same can be said 
about Somalia’s Mooryaan (Marchal 1993), and militant 
youth formations in West Africa (Richards 1996; Ellis 1999; 
Bayart 2000, 227–29; see also below). Other vigilantes as-
sert religious and local identities at the same time, thus po-
siting an alternative way of relating to global discourses. 
Fatima Adamu (2008) shows how groups across the shari’a 
states of northern Nigeria draw legitimacy from different 
and sometimes competing sources, including traditional, 
communal, religious, and political elites (cf. Last 2008).
Aside from their anti-criminal merits and complicated re-
lation to state and law, vigilantes in Nigeria have also be-
come vehicles for inter-communal violence. Johannes 
Harnischfeger detects among vigilantes in Lagos and 
southeastern Nigeria agendas directed not only against cri-
minals, but also targeting members of other ethnic groups 
(2003, 2004). The Bakassi Boys, to name one example, were 
supported by a state governor who capitalized on their 
anti-crime legitimacy. Such links, however, undermined the 
group’s popular legitimacy as it became seen as the tool of 
a corrupt political class. Similarly, the Ooduas Peoples 
Congress, Rufus T. Akinyele argues, established a model for 
many other ethnicist groups to follow (2001; see also Ade-
banwi 2005). Inter-communal violence also drew in vigi-
lantes in central Nigeria’s Plateau state during conflict from 
2002 to 2004, Adam Higazi reports (2008). He describes a 
shift from action against thieves to protection from armed 
political militias, which in turn led vigilantes to ever more 
closely resemble their adversaries.
In a less organized context there have been sporadic out-
bursts of communal violence against (suspected) criminals. 
Black South African townships suffering from poverty and 
unemployment have also cohered against that which comes 
from outside and threatens, or is perceived to threaten or 
impede, the life chances of local citizens. This category of 
external threats includes those who are felt to be taking 
jobs and income opportunities or undercutting local busi-
nesspeople by selling goods at cheaper prices. The target 
around which the “community” coheres in this particular 
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instance is foreign Africans, deprecatingly designated 
Amakwerekwere, who have become victims of xenophobic 
violence (Neocosmos 2010).
While violent exclusion in poor urban zones is thus closely 
related to a communalization of protection against violent 
crime, in middleclass areas the same tendency can be traced 
to a commercialization and privatization of protection 
(Schlichte 2005). Middle- and upper-class residents are able 
to mobilize resources, information, technologies, and or-
ganization in defense of their residential security, leading to 
the proliferation of “gated communities.” In South Africa 
these have typically involved residents setting up access con-
trol around older neighborhoods and blocking off a street 
or blocks of streets. Private security guards are employed to 
regulate the inward and outward movement of people and 
vehicles. Fortified commercial enclaves for work, con-
sumption, and leisure accompany the residential spaces of 
safety of the middle classes. These zones are connected by 
road and transport systems that favor the wealthy, creating 
an interlinked “fortified network,” which could eventually 
“disembed” the city. The trend towards exclusive malls, 
highways, and transport systems like the Gautrain high-
speed rail link between Johannesburg and Tshwane (former 
Pretoria) are symptomatic of this trend in South Africa.
In this environment, the forms of “community” that 
emerge are often mobilized against an “other” in a way that 
increasingly fosters separation. In her study of spatial sep-
aration in Cape Town, Charlotte Lemansky observes that 
“walls and gates have reinforced a vicious cycle of poverty 
and exclusion by concentrating the poorest social groups in 
spaces with minimal economic and political leverage. … 
Furthermore, enclaves do not just respond to difference 
and fear, but actually deepen segregation and reinforce fear 
by excluding difference and limiting social mixing, thus in-
creasing paranoia and mistrust between groups” (Lemanski 
2004, 107). Another study shows that the view of the white 
middle class was that “crime originated from outside the 
community” (Landman 2002, 173). Communities could 
therefore establish „trust“ and social relations that bound 
them together in relation to an external threat. They could 
collectively keep a lookout for this “threat,” and draw on 
and develop practices and technologies in order to do so.
Thus the forms of social cohesion that violent crime is 
creating show signs of being at odds with the forms of so-
cial cohesion envisioned and assumed by policies of 
national governments and international development 
agencies. While there are positive community formations 
to manage risk, poor communities are also showing signs 
of cohering around social exclusion, xenophobia, and sus-
ceptibility to gender and sexual violence. While social 
cohesion exists inside these fragmented and mutually ex-
clusive spatial zones, social polarization between “com-
munities” tends to create separate publics, with different 
benefits, rights, and obligations, and fragmented experi-
ences of citizenship. Debates about autochthony in Came-
roon, Côte d’Ivoire, the DR Congo, and elsewhere 
demonstrate the continent-wide dimension of these phe-
nomena of social exclusion, which often lead to violent 
exchanges and even warfare (Bayart, Geschiere, and 
Nyamnjoh 2001; Geschiere 2009). 
Studies of criminal violence and societal responses such as 
vigilantism and gated communities demonstrate the need 
to move beyond analytical categories of public vs. private 
or legitimate vs. illegitimate violence. Vigilante groups, for 
example, blur the boundaries between protection and 
criminality. They fulfil, in many cases, functions of public 
authority. Their protection service is, however, often li-
mited to select groups in society. As such, they are not 
much different from official state security organs or from 
gated communities protected by „private“ security com-
panies. These fluid phenomena ask for a broad, process-
oriented view on interactions, moving beyond a focus on 
single actors or particular societal groupings. 
3. Youth and Violence
One societal grouping that has received a great deal of aca-
demic consideration regarding its relationship to violence 
is African youth. However, youth does not feature as a 
prominent category in every study of violence and conflict. 
Even if young people – mostly men – play important roles 
in the majority of conflicts and everyday incidents of viol-
ence, these combatants, perpetrators, or victims are not 
necessarily defined on a generational basis. Class, origin, 
ethnicity, religion, or gender are some of the many other 
categories used to explain violent behavior of young 
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people. Nonetheless, analyses of links between youth and 
violence have gained prominence in the past two decades.
3.1. Youth in Africa
Any analysis of youth must come to terms with what be-
comes defined as “youth” in different contexts. “The fact is 
that in Africa local definitions of childhood and youth tend 
to differ from those used in international law and by bodies 
such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),” 
writes Mark Leopold. “People who would be considered 
minors in Europe and North America are frequently ex-
pected to assume a range of ‘adult’ roles, including working 
and being sexually active, as well as fighting wars, while 
others may not count as full ‘adults’ until their late thirties” 
(Leopold 2005b, 693–94; cf. Abbink 2005; Last 2005, 
37–40). Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga adds another dimension 
to the changing definitions of youth in Africa, when he 
points out that during the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville 
being an elder became detrimental to political ad-
vancement and the most powerful – regardless of their age 
– presented themselves as the youngest (Bazuenguissa-
Ganga 2001). Jean and John Comaroff point out that youth 
is often regarded as a transhistorical and transcultural cat-
egory, but is in fact a modern construction. They argue that 
the spread of capitalism created the conditions for the 
emergence of an autonomous category of youth on a global 
scale. The current crisis of capitalist society in Africa and 
elsewhere leads in turn to what can be understood as a cri-
sis of youth. Yet it is exactly in and through this crisis that 
the young have acquired an unprecedented autonomy 
vis-à-vis other generations (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000). 
As in other regions, students of Africa regard youth as a 
group between extremes. Rather than treating it as an ordi-
nary part of society, youth seems to oscillate between hope 
and despair, construction and destruction, peaceful con-
tribution to and violent denial of society. Titles such as 
“Vanguards or Vandals” (Abbink and Van Kessel 2005) or 
“Makers and Breakers” (Honwana and de Boeck 2005) be-
speak the ambiguity. Youth symbolizes the future, and thus 
both fear and hope about coming changes are assigned to 
the young generation. As Mamadou Diouf shows, the 
nationalist projects of the early post-independence years 
projected much of their optimism concerning a fundamen-
tal transformation of African societies – in political, econ-
omic, cultural, and social terms – onto Africa’s youth. 
Paradoxically, the idea of youth as “chief agents of trans-
formation” also entailed its definition as a societal group 
that needs to be „channeled and supervised by adults“ 
(Diouf 2003, 3–4). The long-term economic and edu-
cational investments of the post-independence years 
proved inadequate and ultimately failed.
Youth, not unlike other groupings in society, tend to be 
oriented towards risk, immediate profits, informal prac-
tices, and individualism. Traditional forms of socialization 
through rites, respects for elders, and obedience to adults 
and the state became linked to surveillance, harassment and 
repression (Mbembe 1985). Youth are perceived to have be-
come increasingly independent and critical of older gener-
ations. The street became the central stage for youthful (i.e. 
unruly) behavior. Young African migrants, musicians, loi-
terers, sapeurs (swanks), and thugs became the subject of 
moral panic in Africa, but also in Europe and North Ameri-
ca. Youth appeared more and more as a threat to rather 
than a hope for society, fundamentally as a societal element 
uprooted from social bonds such as family, ethnic group, or 
nation (Diouf 2003, 4–8). Optimists view these phenomena 
as legitimate resistance to repression and exclusion (Mac-
Gaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; contributions in Tru-
dell 2002), while pessimists understand it as mere 
delinquency and symptoms of crisis (Cruise O’Brien 1996). 
Both perspectives allow insights: The recourse to violence, 
as a common practice of many youth movements across the 
continent at least since the colonial era, often targets unre-
sponsive authorities or, in the absence of functioning police 
forces, criminal delinquents; but there also have been out-
breaks of xenophobic violence or the transformation of 
vigilante to mafia groups. As Diouf notes, even violent de-
monstrations “always have an element of playing hooky,” 
and hereby express nihilism, childish naughtiness, and 
idealism at the same time (Diouf 2003, 9).
The ambiguous role of youth as linchpin of positive trans-
formation or catastrophic destruction is mostly been put 
forward in connection with young men. Young women and 
children are rarely attributed such positive or negative 
agency. In particular child soldiers and young females 
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raped during civil war are often regarded as the quintessen-
tially powerless victims of evil violence. In opposition to 
such views and in line with a general trend in African 
studies to emphasize the agency of subordinated groups, 
youth agency has become a major matter of analysis. The 
volume edited by Alcinda Honwana and Filip de Boeck, 
which probes the role of violence as a means of self-as-
sertion, constitutes the current milestone (2005; in par-
ticular contributions by Honwana and Utas on war 
situations and contributions by Diouf and Biaya on ques-
tions of legitimacy, identity, and violence; see also Chris-
tiansen, Utas, and Vigh 2006). 
The study of violence, conflict, and youth in Africa has 
produced several edited volumes during ecent years, most 
of which employ qualitative ethnographic methods. These 
studies link youth with a variety of issues such as historical 
perspectives and political mobilization (Abbink and van 
Kessel 2005), migration and conflict (Hart 2008, also in-
cludes case studies from other regions), memory and states 
(Bay and Donham 2006), and inter-generational negoti-
ation and social becoming under exclusionary and violent 
circumstances (Christiansen, Utas, and Vigh 2006). The 
lack of a gender perspective in many works on youth and 
violence in Africa is partly balanced – though only in pass-
ing remarks rather than thorough analysis – by con-
tributions to Jon Abbink and Ineke van Kessel’s (2005) 
volume on youth politics and conflict, some of which de-
monstrate how gender roles foster violent behavior by 
young men as protectors. Women, on the other hand, are 
not only victims of violence, but may also become per-
petrators, as in the case of “liberation fighters” (Cock 
1991; Weber 2006). However, the complexities inherent to 
the topics of youth, gender, and violence remain under-
studied save for very few case studies (Heald 1989; Glaser 
1998a). The volume edited by Abbink and Van Kessel 
(2005) also sheds light on the changes in generational 
power balances, which are particularly strong during and 
after violent conflict. Violent practices can empower 
younger generations, but older strata in traditionally ge-
rontocratic (and patriarchal) societies often find ways to 
co-opt youth and their violent means for their own pur-
poses (Abbink and van Kessel 2005, in particular con-
tributions by Last and Burgess).
3.2. South African Youth after Apartheid
In South Africa youth have been stereotyped in exemplary 
terms as either “Heroes or Villains” (Seekings 1993). Under 
apartheid and especially after the student uprising of 1976 
the African National Congress (ANC) regarded youth as 
the “shock troops of resistance” (Glaser 2000, 1). The 
ANC’s strategy of rendering the country ungovernable 
through strikes, boycotts, and attacks on state represen-
tatives was largely based on the “young lions.” The destruc-
tiveness directed against the apartheid system found a 
counterpart in youth organizations’ campaigns against 
drug abuse and criminal violence in the townships. Youth 
activists were seen as, and perceived themselves as, a moral 
force, entrusted not only with resistance, but also with dis-
ciplining the township population. Institutions like ad-hoc 
“people’s courts” emerged, suspected informers were 
physically punished, and strikes and boycotts violently en-
forced (Marks 2001, 52–54, 82–98; Seekings 1993, 97).
Towards the final demise of apartheid perspectives on non-
white South African youth changed radically. A “lost gener-
ation” was “discovered,” whose political engagement 
impacted negatively on their schooling and career chances in 
a post-apartheid society. Such alienated young men with a 
wealth of experience with violence were seen as an imminent 
danger (Marks 2001, 6; Seekings 1993, 5). The term “comt-
sotsi” (an amalgam of “comrade” and “tsotsi” or small time 
gangster), invented in the townships, became widely propa-
gated. Clive Glaser’s study of Soweto’s gangs between 1935 
and 1976, “Bo-Tsotsi,” details how marginalized and violent 
youth used the sub-urban space. This stratum of society oc-
casionally joined political demonstrations and riots, but not 
always for purely idealistic purposes (Glaser 1998b; 2000).
In parallel the high incidence of gendered violence in 
South Africa gained greater academic consideration. 
Mamphela Ramphele states that “Apartheid defined black 
men out of the community of patriarchs” (Ramphele 2002, 
113–14; cf. Ramphele 2000; Reynolds 2000; Shefer et al. 
2008) The traditional male roles of protecting and feeding 
the family came under attack as the state was extremely vi-
olent and unemployment and labor migration were wides-
pread. Young men reacted to this crisis of masculinity with 
the formation of peer groups, which were particularly sus-
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picious of outsiders’ interest in “their” women. Violence 
was however also directed against the latter: “It was a cul-
ture, in many respects defined in opposition to femininity, 
which subjected women to terrifying levels of coercion and 
sexual violence.” (Glaser 1998b, 308-9; cf. Mager 1998 for 
rural counterparts between 1945 and 1960).
As Jeremy Seekings cautions, ascriptions of violence to 
youth do not tally with the everyday experience of a large 
majority of young people. Rather the regular experience of 
violence as perpetrator or victim is restricted to a minority. 
Research, in Seekings’s opinion, fails to understand the 
everyday lives of that majority. As he points out, the moral 
panic about youth quickly abated in the post-apartheid era 
as society became more concerned with other problems 
(Seekings 2006, 4-9). The everyday criminal violence that 
rose to one of the world’s highest rates was unexpectedly as-
cribed not to the young, but to (Black) criminals in general.
3.3. Young Combatants in West African Civil Wars
Youth as perpetrators of extreme violence became a major 
issue in analysis of the civil war in Sierra Leone and to a 
more limited extent Liberia. The debate’s starting point in 
the West was a piece in the Atlantic Monthly, “The Coming 
Anarchy,” where Robert Kaplan describes West African 
youths as “loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a 
fluid that was clearly on the verge of igniting” and goes on 
to describe “places where the Western Enlightenment has 
not penetrated and where there has always been mass po-
verty,” where “people find liberation in violence.” The 
author perceived this violence as apolitical and irrational 
(Kaplan 1994, 2000).
Paul Richards set out to prove Kaplan wrong. His book 
Fighting for the Rainforest describes the leadership, rank-
and-file, and social environment of the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), which started the war in 1991 and lost 
it in 2000. Richards seeks to demonstrate the RUF’s “prac-
tical rationality of war“ (1996, xxi), even including violent 
acts as horrific as the chopping off of civilians’ hands and 
arms. He analyses war and violence as performance and 
discourse, expressive acts through which otherwise disfran-
chised people empower themselves, delving into the sub-
jectivities of the RUF’s leadership, presented as excluded 
intellectuals, and their young followers. The latter are 
understood as embedded in West Africa’s rain forest cul-
ture. Richards also describes the local adaptation of global 
media images, including interesting insights into the cultu-
ral appropriation of the first Rambo film.
Where Kaplan’s piece was of interest for its supposed in-
fluence in policy circles and its exemplary representation of 
what may be called a postmodern Orientalism, Richards’s 
equally controversial approach stirred great academic in-
terest and disagreement, particularly among West African 
scholars. A special issue of Africa Development provided a 
critique of Richards’ book. Most pointedly,Yusuf Bangura’s 
extensive review criticizes Richards’s framework of violent 
actors’ subjective rationality and his supposedly undif-
ferentiated conception of youth (1997). Indeed Richards’s 
aim of disproving Kaplan’s claim of actor irrationality 
leads him to stark claims about the means-ends rationality, 
discipline, and homogeneity of the RUF. He also tends to 
understate and legitimize RUF violence without taking its 
victims’ views into account. Bangura argues that, while 
actor rationality should not be completely discarded, RUF 
fighters’ logic of action was not only political, but also an 
expression of banditry, hedonism and brutality (1997). He 
thereby anticipated more general findings on civil wars and 
armed groups, positing that political violence in civil wars 
tends to derail and become mixed up with and even driven 
by „private“ issues (Kalyvas 2003). 
Bangura and other authors in the special issue propose a 
different view of RUF fighters, which they portray as re-
bellious “lumpen” youth with little ideological grounding 
and a tendency to anti-social behavior. The reference to 
Marxist thinking about a usually anti-revolutionary 
lumpen-proletariat seems, however, not entirely free from 
disdain for the largely uneducated forces in the RUF. These 
urban-based and until then urban-oriented scholars seem 
just as puzzled by the sudden power of the young rural 
strata as was Sierra Leone’s urban (intellectual) public in 
general (Bangura 1997; Rashid 1997; Abdullah 1997; see 
also Gberie 2005). 
Richards and related researchers continued their inquiry 
into the “hinterland” of Sierra Leone and its disfranchised 
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young population, pointing to economic, educational, and 
socio-political constraints, and the need for protection, as 
reasons to join Sierra Leone’s armed groups (Peters and Ri-
chards 1998; Peters 2004, 2006; Zack-Williams 2001; see also 
Utas 2008 for similar findings in Liberia.). Also related to 
this are generational conflicts, especially with quasi-feudal 
customary chiefs (Richards 2005; Fanthorpe 2001, 2006).
4. Concluding Remarks
Since the Cold War, research on violence in Africa has 
made important advances, focusing more closely on viol-
ence that is not employed to directly gain political power. 
Even regarding some civil wars, as in the case of Sierra 
Leone, the center of attention moved beyond elite and state 
interest, to take into account motivations of rank-and-file 
combatants. Youth has become an important category of 
analysis, along with vigilantism and criminality. This is a 
welcome development in the study of violence in Africa, 
given that intra-societal violence was largely neglected in 
previous decades.
However, categories like youth are also shown to have only li-
mited analytical value. Youth is a category too broad to com-
prehend the lifeworlds of specific perpetrators of violence. 
Currently, if a strict age parameter is employed, a majority of 
Africans may be categorized as youth. However, only a frac-
tion of Africa’s youth is involved as victims or perpetrators of 
mass violence. The changing and spatially different cultural 
perceptions of who is considered youth and for what reason 
also limit the analytical value and comparability of the cat-
egory. Accordingly, use of the category has been contested in 
Sierra Leone, where the Marxist term „lumpen proletariat“ 
has been proposed for fighters in the civil war. In South Afri-
ca, changing societal categorization of violent criminals also 
led to a change in academic perceptions. The analysis of 
youth in relation to violence thus needs to put other para-
meters, such as class, gender, and location at the center. Only 
then can we understand which groups in society employ 
which forms of violence, where, against whom, at what his-
torical moment, and for which reasons.
The category of vigilante, too, promises only limited in-
sight into questions of societal responses to generalized in-
security and criminal violence, given that the term is 
derived from these armed organizations’ supposed moti-
vation for the employment of violence. Vigilantes can be 
protectors of communities in the positive sense, yet em-
pirical research has shown that they may be better analyzed 
as part of public authority. It thus seems necessary to move 
beyond perpetrators’ motivations for using violence. While 
motivations are particularly important for the assignment 
of guilt and responsibility, social scientists need to be inter-
ested in more aspects than prosecutors and judges. Moti-
vations are not only very difficult to assess (given that 
social science lacks the means of interrogation available to 
the police), motivations are bound to be heterogeneous 
(particularly among groups of perpetrators) and subject to 
change depending on what may be called structures of op-
portunity and constraint. Future research should thus con-
centrate more on the outcomes and effects of violence on 
social structures, on state and societal responses to viol-
ence, and on the interaction processes between per-
petrators, victims, and observers of violence.
More generally, it seems that the study of violence suffers 
from the general disregard for the larger political and 
socio-economic structure of contemporary African so-
cieties. During the Cold War, analysts employing Marxist 
theories aspired to understand African societies as structu-
ral hierarchies (admittedly with only limited success). In 
societies with a large majority of peasants and almost no 
proletariat, dominated by a thin layer of political elites, 
classical Marxist class analysis yielded only very limited in-
sights (see for example on Zaire Schatzberg 1980, 14–32). 
Nonetheless this was at least an attempt to examine a so-
ciety as a whole and understand interdependencies be-
tween its component groups. Contemporary Africanist 
social science instead prefers to focus on particular actor 
groups. A renewed focus on societal structures as a whole 
may thus add valuable insights into causes, processes, and 
outcomes of violent phenomena.
Which phenomena will dominate empirical research in the 
coming years? The rise in the frequency of civil wars in the 
1990s, it seems, may be in a process of reversal. Major 
clusters of violent crisis – most notably in West Africa – 
seem to have become more stable. In the Great Lakes re-
gion, most wars and conflicts have been resolved or con-
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tained in recent years. Yet the problem of ex-combatants 
without a social and economic stake in post-conflict so-
cieties remains a challenge, as is the exclusion of large parts 
of the population from political and economic par-
ticipation. Post-conflict violence, often linked to democra-
tization processes, is likely to become a pressing societal 
problem in the coming years.
Without portraying Africa as a continent of criminality, it 
can also be expected that research will shift to delinquency 
and related societal developments in urban spaces. Along-
side the growth of the younger generations, urbanization 
constitutes the most important socio-geographic and de-
mographic trend on the continent. Rapid economic growth 
and a more even distribution of wealth, which could by it-
self do a great deal to resolve societal crisis, seems at the 
moment a rather faint hope in most countries. The study 
of violence in poverty-stricken urban areas will quite prob-
ably constitute a major area of future research. Given the 
uneven development of political figurations on the conti-
nent, the relation between violence and politics will, how-
ever, remain at the top of the agenda.
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